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1 Introduction
In the more than ten years since the first thorough treatise of auctions as a methodological
tool for value elicitation in applied economics and marketing research (Lusk and Shogren, 2007),
the literature on experimental auctions has been accumulating at an increasing rate. For exam-
ple, in the years 2016 and 2017, more than 100 papers per year were published on ‘experimental
auctions’, representing roughly a 35% increase from an average of 80 papers/year for the years
2013 to 2015 (own calculations based on a Web of Science search for the terms ‘experimental’
+ ‘auctions’; see also Figure 1 for a time trend).
Experimental auctions have become a popular method for valuation research because they
allow economists, psychologists, and marketers to determine the monetary value people place
on non-market goods in order to carry out cost-benefit analysis, to determine the welfare effects
of technological innovation or public policy, to forecast new product success, and to understand
individual’s behavior as citizens and consumers (Lusk and Shogren, 2007). Businesses are eager
to develop an understanding of the factors affecting consumers’ willingness-to-pay (WTP) for
their products in the hope that this may lead to better product adoption and pricing decisions.
One of the big advantages of auctions, often advertised by its proponents, is that (given incentive
compatibility) auctions do not, in principle, suffer from the problem of stated preferences surveys
because they are not hypothetical; i.e., they involve exchanging real money for real goods in
an active market. In addition, in experimental auctions, the price paid is separate from what
the winner(s) bid, so in theory they are incentive compatible mechanisms. Finally, in contrast
to non-hypothetical choice experiments run with real products and money where one needs to
estimate the WTP values using discrete choice models, one can directly obtain each respondent’s
WTP value in auctions from the bids. However, in practice there are a variety of factors that
could potentially affect auction outcomes that deserve greater attention.
While Lusk and Shogren (2007) provide a thorough discussion of various issues involving
experimental auctions (e.g., training and practice, endowment or full bidding approach, learning
and affiliation etc.), there have been significant recent developments in the literature on many
of these issues. For example, Lusk and Shogren (2007) when discussing the pros and cons of the
endowment and the full bidding approach, they argue that if there are perfect field substitutes
to products offered in the full bidding approach, then the bids for each of the products will be
censored at the market price of the products and the differences in optimal bids might differ
from the differences in values.1 Since field substitutes have no effect on bids in the endowment
approach, Lusk and Shogren (2007) recommend the endowment approach when outside options
exist for the auction goods. Alfnes (2009) on the other hand, challenges this view and develops
1In the endowment approach, subjects are endowed with one product and are asked their WTP to exchange
the endowed product with an upgraded product. In the full bidding approach, subjects bid on two or more
products simultaneously.
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a theoretical model that shows that if two alternatives that are offered in an auction differ in
only one or two attributes, have the same set of field substitutes and are difficult to resell, the
difference in optimal bids is equal to the difference in value.
Another example is the issue of eliciting valuations over multiple rounds in auctions and post-
ing information (i.e., price from previous round) in between rounds. While Lusk and Shogren
(2007) presented a balanced discussion on this issue of bid affiliation along with some empiri-
cal results indicating that posted prices have no effect on bids, their discussion did not settle
the issue and instead led to an adversarial collaboration of researchers with different views on
this issue. This adversarial collaboration resulted in the paper by Corrigan et al. (2012) which
presented results from induced value experiments that show that posting prices between rounds
creates larger deviations from induced values. In addition, they found that in an auction for
lotteries, exposing subjects to price feedback makes them more likely to commit preference
reversals. As a consequence, price posting between rounds has become much less common in
recent literature.
Figure 1: Time trend of number of publications on the topic of ‘experimental’ + ‘auction’
In addition to a glimpse of recent developments in the literature we offer above, in the rest
of the paper we take a more systematic exploration of the practicalities of running an auction.
Our general aim is to discuss issues that are important to consider in any experimental design
as well as to discuss recent trends in the experimental auctions literature. Our literature review
cannot be all inclusive since the volume of papers published since Lusk and Shogren’s (2007)
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book is voluminous (take a look at Figure 1 again). Instead, we highlight papers that we believe
are important from a methodological point of view; hence, we excluded many papers that just
use experimental auctions as a tool for elicitation of values.
In the next section, we begin by discussing an issue that we believe is often ignored in
studies that try to experimentally manipulate a factor in order to establish causality. This issue
is randomization to treatment, which is a concern not just in auction studies but also to many
experimental studies. In Section 3 we discuss more specific design issues that have not been
given due attention such as a discussion on elicitation formats, the practice of forming multiple
auction groups in a single session, house money effects in auctions etc. In Sections 4 and 5 we
bring up the issues related to sample size and power as well as the need to focus not just on p-
values but also on the magnitude of the estimates. We then discuss standard ways of analyzing
auction data in Section 6 as well as an overview of recent advances. Then, we go over recent
trends in relation to pre-registration and pre-analysis plans as a means to reduce p-hacking and
increase replicability in the social sciences in Section 7. In Section 8 we discuss issues related to
the conduct of auctions in the field vs. the lab. Our penultimate section (Section 9) is devoted
in reviewing the literature on behavioral factors that appear to be important when considering
what might affect auction outcomes. We then conclude in the final section.
2 Randomization to treatment in auctions
Many experimental auction studies are used as value elicitation vehicles to uncover con-
sumers’ WTP for novel goods and services and their attributes. As a value elicitation mech-
anism, these auctions do not normally apply the experimental method to estimate effect sizes
from treatment and control groups since the aim is generally to construct a market that does
not exist outside the auction environment. Controls are often then used in a multi-variate cor-
relational research context in the form of independent variables to isolate the effect of these
variables from other influences and to provide a causal interpretation. For example, one can
regress bids on gender and then provide a potentially causal interpretation of gender effects on
bidding behavior.
There are many other cases however where auction studies are conducted with the use of
experimental designs that hold all other factors constant, so that the change in the outcome of
interest can be associated with changes in the manipulated factor. This is casually referred to
as the gold standard of experimentation for causal inference. For example, in the simplest of
experimental designs, the single manipulated factor would be varied at two levels; e.g., providing
information and not providing information. Causal interpretation of the manipulated factor
(information in this particular example) is then based on the Neyman-Rubin model of causal
inference due to Neyman (his original work appeared in Polish in a doctoral thesis submitted to
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the University of Warsaw; for excerpts reprinted in English and some commentary see Rubin,
1990; Speed, 1990; Splawa-Neyman et al., 1990) and Rubin (1974).
Auction studies that seek to estimate effect sizes from treatment and control groups often
pay too little attention to the fact that causal interpretation based on the Neyman-Rubin model
rests upon the validity of its assumptions. The Neyman-Rubin model explains causality through
a framework of potential outcomes: each unit has two potential outcomes, one if the unit is
treated and another one if it is untreated. A causal effect is then defined as the difference
between the two potential outcomes; that is, the response of the same unit under a treatment
and a control condition (the counterfactual).
In social science, however, we cannot observe both alternative conditions for the same unit
because the unit changes irreversibly once it is exposed to a treatment. Note that in the
Neyman-Rubin model, treatment effects from a within-subjects design do not have a causal
interpretation and so there is a need to invoke additional assumptions (Holland, 1986; West and
Thoemmes, 2010). In order to infer causality, one needs to compare the expected outcome of
units that received different treatments in order to estimate the treatment effect. The key point
is that by randomly assigning units to the treatments, the difference between the experimental
and control units can be considered an unbiased estimate of the causal effect that the researcher
is trying to isolate (Rubin, 1974). But why do we need to emphasize random assignment?
Because only by random assignment will groups of units have the same expectation in the
distribution of all covariates which are potentially relevant for the treatment outcome.2 There is
however an important caveat to remember: two randomly assigned groups will be comparable
only with large enough sample sizes so that the sample average of individual characteristics
becomes closer to the average of the population.
There is a practical implication coming out from the previous discussion given that run-
ning experimental auctions requires resources. Given a target sample size dictated by budget
concerns (although there is an increasing demand for more sophisticated ways of determining
sample size; see Section 4), simpler designs (e.g., two treatments), rather than complicated
designs (e.g., 2 × 2 design), are more likely to achieve balance of characteristics that are po-
tentially relevant for the treatment; i.e., to achieve randomization to treatment. The reason
why randomization to treatment is important is because without it, we cannot be confident
about the causal interpretation of the effect of the manipulated factor. For example, Briz et al.
(2017) document a failure of randomization to treatment in experimental auctions by utilizing
information from the practice auctions rounds. While practice auction rounds are normally
2It can be useful to view randomization through the lense of identification through instrumental variable
(IV) regressions. A valid IV is one that is highly correlated with the explanatory variable of interest and can
only affect the outcome variable through this explanatory variable of interest. A coin flip (or random draw) is
a perfect IV; it completely determines assignment to the treatment or control but is not directly related to the
outcome variable.
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not reported or analyzed in auction studies, Briz et al. (2017) find a statistically significant
treatment effect both in the practice as well as in real auction rounds. However, the treatment
in their study was applied only after the practice auction rounds and hence the effect they find
using the real auction data cannot be interpreted as causal but likely a result of some unbalance
between the groups in some characteristics.
While it is quite a popular practice to use statistical tests to detect imbalance between
groups in one or more characteristics, there is increasing discussion about how appropriate the
use of such tests are. This is because any statistical test would test for the null H0 : µA = µB
where µA and µB are the population means of two treatment groups. However, the researcher
is interested in evaluating balance in the sample, not in the population where the samples come
from. Thus, the issue of balance does not involve inference to populations (Ho et al., 2007;
Imai et al., 2008). As far as the economics literature is concerned, the pitfalls of using balance
tests is discussed in Deaton and Cartwright (2016).3 Deaton and Cartwright (2016) advice that
instead of reporting balance tests, researchers should report the standardized difference in means
(Imbens and Rubin, 2016; Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009) calculated as |x¯1− x¯2|/
√
(s21 + s
2
2)/2
for continuous variables and as |pˆ1−pˆ2|/
√
(p1(1− p1) + p2(1− p1))/2 for dichotomous variables
with x¯j, pˆj and s
2
j (j = 1, 2) denoting the group means, prevalences and variances, respectively
(Austin, 2009). The standardized difference is a scale-free measure and Cochran and Rubin’s
(1973) rule of thumb establishes a threshold of 0.25, below which the effect size of the difference
is expected to be small.
Proper randomization to treatment does not always ensure complete balance. However,
imbalance in a baseline variable is only potentially important if that variable is related to the
outcome variable (Altman, 1985). Although baseline balance is not required to make valid
inferences, the general advice is that even with randomization to treatment, observed covariates
should be taken into account in the analysis (Senn, 1994, 2013).
In our view, randomization to treatment in auction studies is complicated by the fact that
auctions generally require a group of subjects to gather in a single place at a specified time to
perform an auction session. The literature has taken various approaches on this issue. In some
studies, a whole session comprises a group over which an auction is performed (e.g., Lee and
Fox, 2015), while in other studies, subjects in a given session are split into multiple auction
groups (e.g., Drichoutis et al., 2017). In the latter case, it is possible to apply experimental
treatments on a between-subject basis within the same session. If one considers time of the day
and day of the week as additional confounds, then randomization to treatment will be harder
to achieve given a certain sample size, especially when one adopts the session-group approach
3Hypothesis testing of imbalance is characterized as superfluous and misleading in the CONSORT (Consol-
idated Standards of Reporting Trials) statement endorsed by prominent medical journals (BMJ, Lancet etc.)
(Moher et al., 2010, pp. 17).
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rather than the multiple groups-session approach.
Randomization to treatment can also be affected even by very subtle things - so one needs to
be very careful and cognizant of many issues. As an example, consider a case where subjects are
seated in the lab in the order they arrive. It could as well be that if randomization is performed
according to where subjects are seated (which could plausibly happen if ones uses zTree, for
example, and connects computers in sequence to the server), then additional care has to be
taken so that not all late-arrivals (students sometimes also arrive in groups) are allocated to
the same auction group and potentially to the same treatment.
3 Experimental design issues
In this section we discuss a few issues that we believe can help in establishing good practice
in the field.
3.1 Elicitation formats
One of the first design choices a researcher has to make is to decide on the mechanism that
will be employed in the study. To get a rough sense of how popular some of these choices are,
we used Google Scholar’s search engine to tabulate the number of hits each auction mechanism
has. Table 1 shows that the second price auction (SPA) clearly is the most popular mechanism
in researchers’ toolkit followed be the BDM mechanism. While the BDM mechanism is not an
auction per se, it is often classified as such because it is seen as an alternative when one cannot
easily put together a group of people (e.g., in field settings such as in supermarkets).
So why do some researchers choose other nth price auctions (NPAs) or the random NPA
over the SPA? While we cannot definitively know the answer to this question in every single
case, we believe that this choice comes as a response to a popular paper (Shogren et al., 2001)
that showed that SPAs fall short in revealing preferences for subjects that are off-margin of
the market clearing price (i.e., their value is not close to the 2nd highest price). In the random
NPA, even off-margin bidders are not de-motivated to bid their true value because it is highly
likely that their bid is close to the market clearing price. The disadvantage of a NPA is that
it can logistically have a higher cost since the number of units sold in each auction increase
proportionally with n. In addition, in the case of a random NPA one cannot predict how many
units of the good will be needed or sold in the auction. Therefore, in cases when the good is
hard to produce or is costly to produce (remember that in most cases auctions are used to elicit
values for products that are not yet in the market), then it is likely that researchers will shift
their preference to other mechanisms.
The BDM mechanism is a popular mechanism because of its ability to elicit valuations on an
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Table 1: Number of Google Scholar search results citing different elicitation mechanisms
Mechanism N of search results
Second (or 2nd) price auction 12,032
Third (or 3rd) price auction 154
Fourth (or 4th) price auction 84
Fifth (or 5th) price auction 91
(Random) nth price auction 432
BDM mechanism or BDM auction 1,513
Note: Table shows Google Scholar cumulative search results for the mechanism name as shown in the first
column of the table and possible variants of the name. Results were retrieved on August 9, 2018 and were
not checked if the respective study actually employed the mechanism or whether was just citing another
study that employed the mechanism. The absolute numbers are, therefore, indicative and should only be
interpreted with respect to the resulting ranking.
individual basis; i.e., you don’t need a group of people. Therefore, it is normally favored outside
of the lab where it is harder to recruit people to participate in an experiment at the same time.
This is exactly the reason why the BDM mechanism is the favored mechanism in neuroimaging
studies (see for example Kang and Camerer, 2013; Lehner et al., 2017; Linder et al., 2010; Tyson-
Carr et al., 2018; Veling et al., 2017) where interaction between individuals while undertaking
a brain scan is almost non-existent. Many neuroimaging studies cite Plassmann et al. (2007) as
the earliest demonstration of the use of the BDM task while subjects take a brain scan although
it was clearly preceded by Grether et al. (2007) and Rowe (2001).4
Although the BDM mechanism is the second most popular elicitation mechanism in the
literature (see Table 1), there are a number of issues that researchers need to know and consider
when using this mechanism. To begin with, Karni and Safra (1987) showed that the BDM
mechanism is not incentive-compatible in valuing lotteries, even for rational agents. Even though
this should not be a concern for experimental auction studies that seek to elicit valuations
of products, Horowitz (2006) pointed out that the BDM mechanism may not be incentive-
compatible even when the objects involve no uncertainty, as in the case of regular products.
Although Horowitz (2006) point that this non-incentive-compatibility also holds for the Vickrey
auction and general nth-price auctions, the literature has more often taken aim at the BDM,
resulting in an accumulating body of research dealing with the pitfalls of using the BDM.
Banerji and Gupta (2014) provided theoretical and experimental results that confirm the role
of expectations in the BDM mechanism. Specifically, they varied the support (i.e., the range) of
4The only neuroimaging study we are aware of that actually employed a two-person Vickrey auction is
Delgado et al. (2008). In this study, subjects before entering the scanner met their opponent which would bid
according to pre-defined strategies. The subject in the scanner would randomly receive one of four induced
values and then could only select to bid one out of four options. In addition, in an interesting variant of the
BDM mechanism, Lehner et al. (2017) use motor effort as the currency where subjects bid how many seconds
they would be willing to apply 50% of their maximal grip force in order to receive the displayed reward of either
money or food.
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the randomly drawn bid for a chocolate and found a significant difference in valuations, a result
which is in accordance with expectation-based reference points. Other relevant studies include
Mazar et al. (2013) who tested the sensitivity of valuations to the underlying distribution in the
BDM using travel mugs and Amazon vouchers; Urbancic (2011) using a within-subjects design
and a gift certificate product redeemable for cookies; and Rosato and Tymula (2016) who used
products with higher market values such as a backpack, an iPod Shuﬄe, and a pair of noise-
canceling headphones. Cason and Plott (2014) provide evidence that the BDM mechanism is a
problematic measurement tool because bids reflect mistakes rather than true preferences due to a
failure of game form recognition; i.e., subjects behave as if they bid in a first price auction. More
recently, Vassilopoulos et al. (2018) found that previous research findings that casted doubts on
the incentive compatibility of the BDM mechanism were made on valid grounds. Specifically,
they found that bids derived from the BDM mechanism are indeed dependent on the underlying
distributions of the random competing bid (due to the expectations they generate) and on the
anchoring of bids to the chosen price support.
But if the BDM mechanism is biased in all the ways described above, what is the alternative?
Given that the main reason for using the BDM is that it avoids having to recruit many people
to be at the same place at the same time to elicit their valuation, the next best solution could
be to employ a SPA with just two subjects forming an auction group. Although this could be
considered slightly more complicated than the BDM, it would still be possible to perform this
in the field. For example, one could have two interviewers that will interview subjects almost
simultaneously at two sides of a survey location. Instructions could explain to subjects that
they are bidding against an unknown bidder on the other side of the location. Bids can then be
easily compared to each other. This way, a SPA would be performed without having to resort
to the biases associated with the BDM mechanism.
There is one potential caveat to our last suggestion. Subjects with altruistic incentives are
likely to submit a zero bid in the hope that their bid would be chosen as the binding price
and everyone else participating in the auction would get to buy the item for nothing. If such
altruistic motives are prevalent, then small groups of auctions would enhance these motives.
Whether this is a significant problem or not (i.e., how prevalent such a behavior could be in
reality), is a topic worthy of further investigation.
3.2 Number of bidders in a group
An additional design choice which is related to our discussion in the previous subsection
is the number of subjects in an auction group. Many studies in the literature have formed
auction groups based on the number of subjects that showed up in a given session (e.g., Lee
and Fox, 2015). If the number of subjects is not kept constant e.g., by turning away extra
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subjects, this will result in auction groups having different numbers of subjects. Given that
aversion to turning away subjects should generally be correlated with the difficulty of recruiting
subjects, then student subjects should be the easiest group of subjects to turn away. Turning
away subjects is a very common practice in the experimental economics literature and this is
exactly the reason why an experimenter needs to establish explicit show-up fees.
However, recent theoretical (Banerji and Gupta, 2014) and empirical studies (Rosato and
Tymula, 2016) have shown that if subjects have reference dependent preferences, then the
equilibrium bid is lower when the number of bidders is larger. Hence, one could eliminate a
possible confound by keeping the number of bidders constant across auction groups. Given our
discussion in the previous subsection about using a small number of subjects in each auction
group (which can be as low as two subjects) that could be an alternative to the BDM, then one
could also design a study using multiple auction groups in a given session (ideally subjects would
be randomly matched into groups). This practice could be beneficial on two more fronts. One is
that by having multiple groups in a given session and the fact that one can likely perform only
one session at a time, perfect collinearity between session (a given session can confound time
of the day effects and day of the week effects) and auction group is avoided. Furthermore, the
general experimental economics literature often treats a group of subjects as one independent
observation (e.g., Abbink and Hennig-Schmidt, 2006; Keser et al., 1998). Therefore, doing more
auction groups in an experiment maximizes the number of independent observations. Another
advantage of multiple auction groups is that it can reduce the risk of disruption of the experiment
in case one of the participants decides to quit in the middle of the experiment; in this case, it
would be possible to go forth with the auction, discarding only the auction group affected by
the participant’s defection.
3.3 House money and experimenter demand effects
Experimenters are sometimes rightfully concerned that when subjects receive an endowment
of money, they might feel obliged to freely spend some of it in the experiment since they might
consider this not their own money or they might feel obliged to reciprocate to the experimenter.
This effect is called the ‘house money’ effect or sometimes called ‘windfall money’ (e.g., Corgnet
et al., 2014; Jacquemet et al., 2009). Thus, observed bids may not reflect subjects’ true valuation
for the product but rather their need to reciprocate to the experimenter or their moral obligation
to affirm that the product the experimenter is offering is of good value (i.e., an experimenter
demand effect) (Zizzo, 2010).
A remedy could be to let subjects feel that they earned part of their endowment. For
example, tasks from the experimental economics literature can be adopted (often called real
effort tasks). One typical real effort task is the one from Abeler et al. (2011), also used in
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auctions studies in Drichoutis et al. (2017) and Kechagia and Drichoutis (2017). These real
effort tasks do not normally require any prior knowledge, offer little learning possibility, and are
simple enough to apply so that everybody can always complete the task successfully. Typically,
in these tasks, subjects have to count and report the number of zeros shown in a matrix composed
of zeros and ones. The difficulty of the task can be varied by varying the dimensions of the
matrix. A 4×4 matrix for subjects from the general population and a 5×5 matrix for students
can be employed, albeit this decision is rather ad hoc. This task can be repeated (the elements
of the matrix change in each repetition but should be kept the same for all subjects at a given
repetition) and subjects can earn a fixed payment of e.g., e0.5, every time they correctly solve
the task within a given amount of time; e.g., 30 seconds. Since the task is purposefully easy,
evidence from Drichoutis et al. (2017) and Kechagia and Drichoutis (2017) show that the vast
majority of subjects solve this task correctly almost all of the time. It is crucial to make this
task easy enough so that subjects would start off in the auction stage with approximately equal
endowments, given that unequal endowments can confound bidding behavior. There are other
real effort tasks that one could use but we are not aware of any rigorous assessment of the ability
of different tasks to mitigate house money effects in the context of experimental auctions.
An alternative way is to let subjects bid with their own money. For example, one could
provide gift vouchers as the participation fee but then make clear to subjects that they will have
to pay for anything they bid at the auction. Davis et al. (2010) had a group of subjects physically
receive a payment at the beginning of the session (to be considered their own money) while other
subjects received it at the very end of the session with the rest of their earnings. Subjects that
received money at the beginning of the session purchased information more frequently, which
is consistent with increasing risk aversion. Rosenboim and Shavit (2012) prepaid one group
of students two weeks before the experiment and found that this group put a greater effort to
reduce their possible losses and that they also bid lower in a SPA. Zhang et al. (2017) used a
delayed payment mechanism, where subjects at the day of the experiment had to pay with their
own money, while they received their participation fees two weeks later. They found that the
delayed payment mechanism reduced overbidding behavior especially for subjects with liquidity
constraints; i.e., subjects that did not bring enough money to the session.
Taken together, the results from these studies seem to suggest that on the spot payments
after a session induces more risk loving behavior (consistent with a house money effect) which
results in overbidding. Therefore, a pre-paid mechanism (either two weeks before or in the
form of a gift voucher that cannot be cashed) may counteract the house money effect and the
resulting bias.
Overall, we believe that there is still a need for more research to examine the effect of
different payment mechanisms in experimental auction settings. A comprehensive study that
compares bidding behavior across various payments mechanisms would be of interest to the
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literature. In any case, this topic is strongly affected by regulations and ethical practices
considered acceptable in the scientific community and by the non-trivial consideration that a
subject should perceive that the reward obtained is worth the effort of participating in the study.
This is especially challenging in field studies, since obtaining collaboration from operators in
the field (for instance, a supermarket chain or a food specialty store hosting the data collection
phase) is often conditional on the guarantee (or the expectation) that none of the participants
will complain afterwards.
3.4 Number of repetitions and number of auctioned products
Generally, experimenters would prefer doing multiple rounds of an auction given previous
evidence that it improves outcomes (Corrigan et al., 2012). However, the exact number of
rounds to use in an auction is often a matter of trade-off between getting more observations and
subjects spending more time in a session. For computerized experiments, this could be a trivial
problem as the automated procedure allows the auction to roll faster than a paper and pencil
auction experiment (although we don’t see much of the latter anymore). The number of rounds
could also be dictated by sample size calculations (see Equation 1 in Section 4) but normally a
choice between for example an eight-round auction and a nine-round auction will not make a
big difference in the resulting sample size.
As far as the number of products that one can simultaneously auction, there is normally a
trade-off between increasing complexity versus eliciting information for more products as the
number of auctioned products is increased. One also has to be careful because as the number of
different products being auctioned goes up, the ability of subjects to differentiate between the
different versions of the products might be decreased and confusion could arise. In addition,
one has to be cautious about order effects when eliciting valuations for multiple products in
multiple valuation tasks (Belton and Sugden, 2018).
Given that experimental auctions that use multiple products and multiple rounds generally
employ the practice of randomly selecting one product and one round as binding, the conse-
quence of having many products and many rounds is that the probability of any given round or
product becoming binding is reduced. This could lead to subjects treating any particular round
and product as a low-probability event and so the expected cost of misbehaving in any round or
for any product can become relatively small (the cost of misbehaving was a heated discussion
for first price auctions in Harrison (1989) and Harrison (1992); see also Lusk et al. (2007)).
3.5 Experimental instructions
We chose to place our last point about experimental instructions in this section because
we believe that this is an integral part of a design. For experimental economics in general,
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instructions are very important because these help in explaining all aspects of the experiment to
potentially unfamiliar subjects. Moreover, instructions can facilitate replicability of experiments
as well as help identify small details that might explain some of the results obtained under a
particular design.
In order to be able to evaluate a specific experimental auction design, one needs to take a
look at the instructions that were provided to the subjects. Orally transmitted instructions to
subjects without written transcripts would make it impossible for anyone to accurately evalu-
ate or replicate a study, not to mention the possibility that the experimenter could introduce
unknown confounds between sessions if there are improvisations or deviations from the script.
Therefore, when written instructions are in place, it is also important for the experimenter to
strictly follow the script.
One way to minimize or eliminate these confounds is by providing all instructions in elec-
tronic format (given that the experiment is computerized) and by creating interactive screens
where subjects can familiarize themselves with the auction environment and answer practice
questions. One should move on with the experimental auction only when all subjects have really
understood the whole instructional set. That said, one should also be cognizant of the computer
literacy of the subjects that participate in a given session. For example, while students are likely
very good in taking instructions in electronic form and in interacting with a computer, this may
not be true for subjects from the general population. While it is also important to encourage
subjects to ask questions during a session, it is normally preferable that this be done in private
so that the experimenter can first filter the question and answer she wants to provide to the
group.
It goes without saying that experimental instructions should always be evaluated along
with other methodological and statistical analysis standards. Editorial policies could enforce
such submission of instructions by requiring this at the submission stage. From a reviewer’s
perspective, one could push for this practice to be uniformly applied in the field by refusing to
review submissions without the experimental instructions. From the author’s perspective, the
fear of outright rejection could be enough to ensure that instructions are systematically and
properly administered in experiments and then submitted to journals for evaluation.
4 Sample size and statistical testing issues
Scientific hypothesis testing relies on methods of statistical inference to empirically establish
that an effect is not due to chance alone. This has been the gold standard of science ever since
Ronald A. Fisher’s era. A ‘test of significance’ (Fisher, 1925) of a treatment effect establishes
that the effect is statistically significant when the test statistic allows us to reject the null
hypothesis of no difference between two conditions based on a pre-specified low probability
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threshold.5
All statistical hypothesis tests have a probability of making one of two errors: an incorrect
rejection of a true null hypothesis (type I error) representing a false positive; or a failure to
reject a false null hypothesis (type II error) representing a false negative.6 False positives have
received a great deal of attention; academic journals are less likely to publish null results and
p-value hacking makes false positives vastly more likely (Simmons et al., 2011).7
False positives may have more serious implications than false negatives by leading the re-
search community into false avenues and wasting resources. The problem of false positives is
further exacerbated by the fact that researchers may not only file-drawer entire studies but also
file-drawer subsets of analyses that produce non-significant results (Simonsohn et al., 2014). In
addition, researchers rarely take the extra step of replicating their original study (but see Kessler
and Meier, 2014, for an exception).8 Given the well known general lack of reproducibility of
scientific studies in economics (Camerer et al., 2016) and psychology (Open Science Collabora-
tion, 2015) respectively, there is growing concern over the credibility of claims of new discoveries
based on statistically significant findings.9
There have been several calls for actions and proposed solutions for the seemingly high false
positive rate. Nuzzo (2014) reports that p-values are widely misinterpreted as showing the exact
chance of the result being a false alarm when such statements are really only qualified if the odds
that a real effect is there are known in the first place. General rule of thumb conversions cited
in Nuzzo (2014) indicate that “.. . . a p-value of 0.01 corresponds to a false-alarm probability
of at least 11%, depending on the underlying probability that there is a true effect; a p-value
of 0.05 raises that chance to at least 29%.” Exact replications are therefore likely to uncover
5As a side note, according to Brodeur et al. (2016), Fisher supposedly decided to establish the 5% significance
level since he was earning 5% of royalties for his publications.
6A type III error, typically not one that researchers often deal with, occurs when a researcher produces
the right answer to the wrong question (Kimball, 1957). Kennedy (2002) warns that this is not to be confused
with psychologists’ type III error (Kaiser, 1960), which is concerned with concluding significance in the wrong
direction.
7P-hacking refers to the practice of monitoring the data recording process or the outcomes of an experi-
ment and choosing when to stop recording data, what variables to report, which comparisons to make, which
observations to exclude, and which statistical methods to use in order to reach a p-value of 0.05. Brodeur et al.
(2018) surveyed thousands of hypothesis tests reported in top economics journals in 2015 and show that selective
publication and p-hacking is a substantial problem in research employing difference-in-difference methods and
instrumental variables, while randomized control trials and regression discontinuity designs are less problematic.
8Clemens (2015) proposes the terms ‘verification’ and ‘reproduction’ to distinguish between replications and
the terms ‘reanalysis’ and ‘extension’ to distinguish between robustness exercises.
9For psychological studies 36% of the replications yielded statistically significant findings while the mean
effect size in the replications was approximately half the magnitude of the mean effect size of the original effects
(Open Science Collaboration, 2015). For economic science studies, Camerer et al. (2016) found a significant
effect in the same direction as in the original study for 11 replications (roughly 61%) while, on average, the
replicated effect size was 66% of the original. More recently, Camerer et al. (2018) replicated 21 experimental
studies in the social sciences published in Nature and Science between 2010 and 2015 and found a significant
effect in the same direction as the original study for 13 (62%) studies while the effect size of the replications was
on average about 50% of the original effect size.
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false positives although the incentives for individual researchers to self-replicate one of their
experiments are still currently weak.
Other researchers have taken aim at the p-value, calling for a change in the default p-value
threshold for statistical significance from 0.05 to 0.005 for claims of new discoveries (Benjamin
et al., 2018). Another group of researchers responded that instead of adopting another arbitrary
threshold, a better solution would be to make academics justify their use of specific p-values
(Lakens et al., 2018). The criticism for p-values is not new. The epidemiologist Kenneth
Rothman founded the journal Epidemiology in 1990 and as chief editor for a decade, he enforced
the reporting of Confidence Intervals (CIs) instead of p-values. While his policy was successfully
enforced, compliance was superficial as very few authors referred to CIs when discussing results
(Fidler et al., 2004). More recently, journals like Basic and Applied Social Psychology and
Political Analysis have moved one step further by banning p-values altogether (Gill, 2018;
Trafimow and Marks, 2015) while at about the same time, the American Statistical Association
issued a statement on the misuse of p-values and articulated principles of widespread consensus
in the statistical community in order to improve conduct and interpretation of quantitative
science (Wasserstein and Lazar, 2016).10
Recently, Simonsohn et al. (2014) introduced p-curve as a way to distinguish between selec-
tive reporting of non-existent effects and the truth.11 This approach overcomes the limitations
of previous approaches such as the ‘funnel plots’ method (Duval and Tweedie, 2000; Egger et al.,
1997), the ‘fail safe’ method (Orwin, 1983; Rosenthal, 1979) and the ‘excessive-significance’ test
(Ioannidis and Trikalinos, 2007)12. The p-curve tool requires a set of studies to be included in
the analysis and as such, single-papers should contain multiple studies and at least one direct
replication of one of the studies (Simonsohn et al., 2014). Given that self-replication is rare in
the literature, it is quite hard to detect a false positive from single-paper studies.
Type II errors, on the other hand, have not been given similar attention. Zhang and Ortmann
(2013) reviewed 95 papers published in Experimental Economics between 2010 and 2012 and
10Interestingly, Gigerenzer et al. (2004) mention that the Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior
and the Journal of Mathematical Psychology were launched as a way to escape Journal of Experimental Psy-
chology editor’s policy that made null hypothesis testing a necessary condition for the acceptance of papers and
small p-values the hallmark of excellent experimentation.
11P-curve is the distribution of statistically significant p-values for a set of studies. Its shape is diagnostic
of when one can rule out selective reporting as the sole explanation of a set of findings. P-curves that are
left-skewed suggest the presence of intense p-hacking; i.e., researchers file-drawer the subsets of analyses that
produce non-significant results.
12A ‘funnel plot’ is a scatterplot designed to check for the existence of publication bias by depicting a treatment
effect against a measure of study size like total sample size, standard error of the treatment effect or the inverse
variance of the treatment effect. The ‘fail-safe’ method consists of an algorithm in which an overall z-score
is computed by summing individual z-scores and dividing by the square root of the number of scores. The
‘fail-safe’ is the number of studies needed to bring a significant overall p level up to some critical level like 0.05.
The ‘excessive-significance’ test is an exploratory test for examining whether there is an excess of published
statistically significant results as compared with what their true proportion should be in a body of evidence.
See Simonsohn et al. (2014) for details on the limitations of these approaches.
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found that only one article mentions statistical power and sample size issues. Replication studies
(e.g., Maniadis et al., 2014) are particularly prone to false negatives because they are typically
underpowered (Simonsohn et al., 2013).13
As far as experimental auction research is concerned, a priori sample size or power calcula-
tions are almost non-existent in agricultural economics journals. However, journals and editors
outside the subdiscipline are now embracing the idea of including power calculations and we sus-
pect that this would soon be discussed and considered as well in agricultural economics journals.
While there are many statistical programs and packages that allow power analysis and/or calcu-
lation of optimal sample sizes (see for example Table 2 in Bellemare et al., 2016), researchers are
better off getting their hands dirty. In auctions, sample size calculations are facilitated by the
continuous nature of the observed variable (the bid) but could get slightly more complicated if
the repeated nature of the auction setting needs to be taken into account. The reason we believe
that sample size calculations should be an integral part of any experimental auction study is
because researchers may end up with a result which is not statistically significant because the
sample size was not large enough to detect a difference of practical significance. In addition,
resources might be wasted by using a sample size that is much larger than is needed to detect
a relevant difference.
In order to calculate an optimal sample size given a continuous outcome of interest (the bid),
a dichotomous between-subjects treatment and a multiple-round design (i.e., subjects are asked
to submit a bid in multiple rounds for the same product), we first need to assume appropriate
values for the Type I and Type II errors. Following the standards in the literature, we can
assume α = 0.05 (Type I error) and β = 0.20 (Type II error). To compare the means from the
two treatments, µ0 and µ1, with common variance of σ
2 in order to achieve a power of at least
1− β, given a number of repeated measurements M (i.e., auction rounds) as well as a value for
the correlation ρ between observations, the per group/treatment minimum sample size is then
given by (Diggle et al., 2002, p. 30; Liu and Wu, 2005;Kupper and Hafner, 1989):
n =
2(z1−α/2 + z1−β)2(1 + (M − 1)ρ)
M(µ0−µ1
σ
)2
(1)
Note that the formula simplifies to Equation 6 of List et al. (2011) in the case of single-round
auctions by setting M = 1. To calculate a minimum sample size, one needs to feed the above
formula with values for σ, the minimum meaningful difference µ0 − µ1 and ρ. The value of σ
and ρ must not be calculated using the collected data (this is often called retrospective, post-
hoc or observed power). This is because reporting posterior power (or posterior sample size) is
13For example, Simonsohn et al. (2013) argue that the null result obtained in the replication study of Maniadis
et al. (2014), is just a noisy estimate and that the relative effect size is comparable to the original study of Ariely
et al. (2003).
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nothing more than reporting the p-value in a different way since power is a 1:1 function of the
p-value (Gelman, 2018; Hoenig and Heisey, 2001). Drichoutis et al. (2015) and Briz et al. (2017)
provide some examples on how one can use prior literature to find the relevant parameters for
the sample size calculation. In this case, power is called prospective or a priori power (and
similarly for sample size). Sample size calculations should be performed before data collection
so that there is a clear stopping rule that defines the data-collection plan.
The minimum meaningful difference or expected effect size d = µ0− µ1 can be derived from
theoretical predictions or can be defined as the smallest effect size of interest. It can also be
the product of a systematic literature review or it could be informed by auxiliary data, meta-
analysis etc. (Gelman and Carlin, 2014). Gelman and Carlin (2014) also suggested using a broad
range of effect sizes given that past estimates of effect sizes tend to be overestimates. This is
because when the true effect is medium-sized, only small studies that (by chance) overestimate
the magnitude of the effect will pass the threshold for discovery (Button et al., 2013).14 Given
a range of values for d, σ and ρ, one can find an interval of observations per treatment that are
needed to detect a given effect size. This is a trivial calculation and a Stata code example is
provided in the Electronic Supplementary Material. One can even experiment with the number
of rounds at the experimental design stage and find an optimum number of rounds, given that
more rounds are inversely related to the number of observations that are needed per treatment
group.15
Sample size calculations can become more complicated however with more than one treat-
ment level. One would first have to compare which contrasts are of interest. For example,
consider a three treatment scenario where the control is compared with two treatments but the
two treatments are never compared to each other. List et al. (2011) provide an example where
the optimal allocation weighs more heavily to the control by allocating half of the sample to the
control and one fourth to each of the other two treatments. Intuitively, the control is used in
two contrasts while the other two treatments are used in just one comparison each; hence the
14In addition, the pressure of using the criterion of statistical significance may have led published research to
systematically overestimate effect sizes (Lane and Dunlap, 1978) and report inflated effects (Fanelli and Ioannidis,
2013). Analyzing a large number of test statistics (> 50, 000) published in the American Economic Review, the
Journal of Political Economy, and the Quarterly Journal of Economics between 2005 and 2011, Brodeur et al.
(2016) found a misallocation pattern in the distribution of the test statistics consistent with inflation bias. That
is, researchers inflate the value of almost-rejected tests by choosing a slightly more ‘significant’ specification
which amounts to 10% - 20% among the tests that are close to the significant threshold. They do not find that
this problem arises in randomized control trials or laboratory experiments. As a side note, a consequence of the
inflation bias is that if a replication study is powered based on the effect size of the original study, the power of
the replicated study will be lower than intended (Simonsohn, 2015). Simonsohn (2015) suggests that the sample
size of the replication study should be set to 2.5 times that of the original study (given an effect size of the
original study that would give the study 33% power).
15This is easy to show mathematically. If one takes the partial derivative of n with respect to M in equation 1
we have: ∂n∂M =
2(z1−α/2+z1−β)
2(ρ−1)
M2(
µ0−µ1
σ )
2
and because −1 < ρ < 1 then ∂n∂M < 0 which is to say that n and M are
inversely related.
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allocation of observations in each treatment should not be equal.
Sample size calculations that have closed form expressions like the ones laid out above
are typically used for simple statistical models. For more advanced statistical tests, estimation
methods, and special design features, one would need to use simulation methods to approximate
the power of complicated experimental designs. One recent contribution customized to the needs
of experimental economists is the powerBBK package (Bellemare et al., 2016) implemented in
Stata. The package allows the user to specify details about the experimental design e.g., the
number of subjects, number of periods, within or between-subjects design, balance of the design,
to specify individual heterogeneity by means of random-effects terms, accommodates non-linear
models (i.e., logit, probit, tobit) etc.
Now let us take one step back. In the beginning of section 2 we discussed how experimental
auctions are sometimes used as a value elicitation vehicle where the sole interest is in estimating
the mean WTP, µwtp, of a random sample with variance σ
2 from an N(µwtp, σ
2) population
but not in estimating a treatment effect. In this case, we can specify the maximum 100(1 −
α)% confidence interval width so that µwtp is estimated within a tolerance of ±A units. The
minimum sample size nm needed to achieve this precision is the smallest integer satisfying
nm ≥ [(σ/A)z1−α/2]2 (Kupper and Hafner, 1989).
5 Economic significance of estimates
One of the main caveats of p-values is that they do not provide a measure for the strength of
an effect.16 Furthermore, experiments with large sample sizes will be powerful enough to detect
as statistically significant even small differences that maybe are not of practical or economic
significance.
Standardized effect sizes can be an important complement to statistical significance testing.
There are many effect size measures but one of the most popular is Cohen’s (1988) d index, a
pure number, free from measurement units, like many other effect size measures. The d index
is the standardized mean difference of two means over the pooled standard deviation: d = b¯1−b¯2
s
where s2 =
∑n1
i=1(b1i−b¯1)2+
∑n2
i=1(b2i−b¯2)2
n1−n2−2 =
(n1−1)s21+(n2−1)s22
n1−n2−2 is the common variance pooled over the
variances s2j =
∑nj
i=1(bji−b¯j)2
nj−1 of the two groups for j = 1, 2. Given that the t-statistic to test
whether the means are different is t = b¯1−b¯2
s
√
1/n1+1/n2
we can then write d = t
√
1/n1 + 1/n2
(Cohen, 1988, pp.67). This last formula provides useful results because it links the power of
16There is a tendency to describe results that are near-threshold p-values as ‘approaching’ significance
(Pritschet et al., 2016) which is consistent with treating significance as a continuum. This is a statistically
flawed practice. In a popular blog-post, Hankins (2013) lists more than 500 linguistic terms that researchers
use in order to report results that fail the significance test. In fact, there is a web application (called Signify:
http://perma.cc/MX9X-KA5Z) which will let one type the p-value of their results and the application will come
out with a label that makes that p-value sound significant.
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the two-sample t-test with the difference between means d, the common standard deviations s
and sample sizes n1 and n2. The inverse relationship between sample sizes and mean difference
indicates that given a difference, larger samples will increase power. Or that given a total sample
size, the standard error s
√
1/n1 + 1/n2 is minimized by having n1 = n2; that is, equally split
the number of observations into the two treatments (see also Kenny, 1987, pp. 213-214).
As a crude guide, Cohen (1988) offers conventional operational definitions of 0.20, 0.50 and
0.80 for ‘small’, ‘medium’ and ‘large’ values of d, respectively. The values for these effects
should be judged relative to the research field or to the specific content being employed in
any given investigation. In Cohen’s terminology, large or small effect sizes are not meant
to classify treatment effects as ‘important’ or ‘not important’. A ‘small’ effect size is to be
interpreted as something that is really happening in the world but which can only be seen
through careful study. A ‘large’ effect size is an effect which is big enough that can be spotted
with a ‘naked observational eye’ (Cohen, 1988, pp. 13). Cohen (1988) notes that ‘many effects
sought in personality, social, and clinical-psychological research are likely to be small effects.’
With respect to our previous discussion about how effect size and sample size are related and
given a certain power level, this would imply that if one is to identify a psychological treatment
effect in an auction setting, then one should aim for higher sample size because what she is
really trying to find is likely small.
There are many other versions of standardized differences similar to Cohen’s d. For example,
Hedges’s (1981) g applies a correction to the d index, Glass’s ∆ uses the standard deviation of
the control group in the formula for d while Kline (2013) proposes reporting Glass’s ∆ using the
standard deviation for each group. These are all trivial to calculate using today’s software. For
example, in Stata these can all be calculated using the esize command. This set of measures
based on the differences of the means are often called the ‘Difference’ family or the ‘d’ family
for short.
A second type of effect size measures, either called the ‘Correlation’ family or the ‘r’ family,
quantifies the ratio of the variance attributable to an effect and is interpreted as the ‘proportion
of variance explained’. This family includes simple measures like the correlation coefficient r,
the index q which is a measure of differences between correlation coefficients, the index eta-
square η2 which is analogous to the regression R2 and the index ω2 which is analogous to the
adjusted R2. These are all effect size measures easily computable with many software packages
(for example with the esize command in Stata).
For effect sizes from more advanced econometric models, such as random effect models which
are often employed for experimental auction data, the variances coming from different sources
must be accounted for (Selya et al., 2012). Cohen’s (1988) f 2, based on R2 values of different
versions of regression models, can circumvent the shortcomings of other standardized effect size
measures. An application of this approach can be found in Briz et al. (2017). The Electronic
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Supplementary Material provides an example using Stata code about how to calculate Cohen’s
(1988) f 2.
A final way to express a treatment effect in relative terms is to first calculate the predictions
of the estimated model, then average out these predictions (which would correspond to an
average predicted WTP) and find the ratio of the estimated coefficient of the treatment effect
over the average prediction. This approach has been used by Kechagia and Drichoutis (2017).
6 How to analyze auction data
One of the distinct advantages of the auction approach, relative to discrete choice methods, is
that the outcome of interest, WTP, is directly obtained. When combined with an experimental
design where individuals are randomly allocated to control and treatment groups, a study’s
main hypotheses can be easily tested by comparing median, means, or other moments of the
bid distribution across the groups. Moreover, because bids are a continuous measure of value,
the distribution can be inspected without having to make distributional assumptions. As other
studies have shown, bid distributions can be highly skewed or even bi-modal (e.g., Lusk et al.,
2006).
Although auctions provide a direct estimate of the monetary value of a good, there is often
interest in other measures of demand, such as market shares and elasticities. Auction data can
also be used for these purposes without having to resort to econometric models or distributional
assumptions. To illustrate, suppose individual i bid bAi for good A and b
B
i for good B. Which
good would the individual be projected to choose if a retailer set prices pA and pB on goods A
and B?
An individual would be projected to choose the good that provides the highest net value
or consumer surplus, which is given by the difference in one’s value for the good (i.e., the bid
in an incentive compatible auction) and the price. Thus, A is predicted to be chosen over B if
bAi − pA > bBi − pB and bAi − pA > 0. If bAi − pA < 0 and bBi − pB < 0, then the individual would
be predicted to refrain from buying either A or B, as buying either of the goods would generate
a loss.17 In a sample of N consumers, the market share of A is simply a count of the number
of individuals predicted to choose A divided by N. Own-price and cross-price arc elasticities
can be determined by calculating how the market share of A changes when the assumed prices
change. For a fuller treatment of this issue, including examples, see Lusk and Shogren (2007)
or Lusk (2010).
Despite the fact that key insights from auction data often come from summary statistics,
17It is a straightforward matter to extend this logic to more than two goods, in which case the individual
would be expected to choose the product that provided the highest net value. It is also possible to calculate
shares if WTP premiums are elicited rather than full bids for each item (see Lusk, 2010).
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there are common features of auction data that often prompt the need for econometric analysis.
Most notably, auction bids are often censored from below at zero. It is also the case that
auction bids for a conventional good can be censored from above at the field price of the
good outside the experiment (Alfnes, 2009; Harrison, 2006). Although auction experiments
can be constructed to allow negative bidding (Lee and Fox, 2015; Parkhurst et al., 2004), the
practice is still uncommon. However, even in auctions that do not allow negative bids, it is
possible to project the conditional mean bid if negative bids had been allowed through the
straightforward application of the Tobit model. Likewise, the Tobit model can be used to
estimate the conditional mean bid under the assumption that there was no censoring of bid at
field prices.
While the Tobit model is widely used, our experience is that the interpretation of the model’s
coefficients are not well understood. The Tobit model draws a distinction between an uncensored
latent or unobservable variable, b∗, (typically assumed to be Normally distributed) and the
censored variable that is actually observed, b. In the case of censoring from below at zero,
b = b∗ if b > 0, but b = 0 if b ≤ 0. An important point is that the estimates from a Tobit model
are the projected impacts on the mean of the b∗, i.e., the uncensored mean. The parameter from
a simple model that includes only a constant term is the estimated mean of b∗, the uncensored
distribution (i.e., the distribution that theoretically allows zero bids). As a result, when other
explanatory variables are added to the model, the estimated coefficients relate to the marginal
effects on the uncensored bid distribution. Overall, there are four values of potential interest in
a Tobit model: a) marginal effects on the latent, uncensored variable, ∂E[b
∗|x]
∂x
(these are the raw
coefficient estimates) b) on the observed, censored variable, ∂E[b|x]
∂x
c) on positive bids, ∂E[b|b>0,x]
∂x
and d) on the probability of being uncensored, ∂Pr[b>0|x]
∂x
(see Drichoutis et al., 2017, for an
application of the Tobit model with auction data).
But which marginal effects should one use? The answer depends on the question being asked.
An example from outside the world of auctions might help provide some clarity. Imagine that
a coach is interested in the marginal effect of halftime entertainment spending at a basketball
game on the game’s attendance. Data consist of many years of attendance records at games
and spending at each halftime show. The distribution of attendance is censored from above at
the stadium’s capacity, and many observations are exactly equal to the capacity. The coefficient
from the Tobit model associated with halftime spending is the estimate of the marginal effect
of spending on the uncensored mean attendance ∂E[b
∗|x]
∂x
, but as previously mentioned, it is also
possible to estimate the marginal effect of spending on the attendance given that attendance is
censored from above at capacity. Which estimate should be given to the coach? If there are no
plans to expand the size of the stadium in the near future, then we should tell the coach the
marginal effect on the censored distribution. If the coach is considering a stadium expansion
before the next season, then we should tell him/her the marginal effect on the uncensored
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distribution. The decision of whether to expand the stadium might also be informed by the
probability of attendance being censored at the capacity constraint.
A few additional comments about the Tobit model are in order. Just because bids might
be censored at zero does not mean that a Tobit model is always required. The extent to which
estimates from a Tobit model will diverge from ordinary least squares regression depends on the
share of observations that are censored. Unless the share of observations is non-trivial (say, more
than 5%), a Tobit model probably is not worth the trouble. It is also important to recognize
that a Tobit model implicitly imposes the assumption that the effects of an explanatory variable
are identical for censored and uncensored variables. One can relax this assumption by utilizing
a double-hurdle model (Cragg, 1971). The double hurdle model is actually two models: 1)
a probit model, where the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the variable is censored
and zero otherwise, and 2) a truncated regression model utilizing only those observations that
are uncensored. It is sometimes the case that the double hurdle will yield insights that differ
from the Tobit or ordinary least squares (e.g., Lusk and Fox, 2002). The double hurdle model
allows one to specify a different set of independent variables that affect the decision to submit
a positive bid and the second stage which is concerned with the level of the bid given a positive
decision in the fist stage. In the special case where the set of independent variables is the same
for both stages, then the Tobit model is nested within Cragg’s double hurdle model (Burke,
2009).
Combined with our proposal of having smaller groups within a given session (see Section 3.2),
and provided each subject submits bids in multiple rounds, this design creates a particular
nesting with multiple levels. Bids from multiple rounds are nested within an individual, and
the individual is nested within an auction group. This calls for the use of multilevel mixed-
effects model to account for the lack of independence within these groups. An application can
be found in Drichoutis et al. (2017).18 Rather than explicitly modeling these random effects, it
is also possible to produce clustered standard errors to account for such groupings. The extent
to which one approach is preferred over the other depends on how comfortable one is in making
parametric assumptions about the random effects.
Typical motivations for estimating regression models in experimental auction studies relate
to the desire to control for censoring, as described above, or to control for potential differences
in demographics across treatment groups. Randomization of participants to treatments or the
use of within-subject designs lowers the need to worry about demographic controls; however,
the general advice in Senn (1994, 2013) is that observed covariates should be taken into account
in the analysis (see also discussion in Section 2). But there is another reason econometric
models might be useful in analysis of auction data: consumer heterogeneity. Advances in
18In the latest versions of Stata one can estimate such a model via the metobit (qsem) command for version
15 (14).
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discrete choice modeling have highlighted the importance and pervasiveness of heterogeneity
in consumer preferences. As previously mentioned, auction studies are well suited to studying
heterogeneity without econometric analysis. However, the latent class (also referred to as finite
mixture) models or random coefficient models that have become common in the study of discrete
choice data might also be useful in analysis of auction bids if there is reason to believe there
might be heterogeneity in treatment effects.
Heterogeneity in treatment effects might arise in a variety of settings. For instance, many
experimental economics studies have explored various price, information, or ‘nudge’ policies
as they relate to healthfulness of food choice (e.g., Ellison et al., 2014; Muller et al., 2017).
Imagine an experimental auction study where a control group bid on unlabeled items and a
treatment group bid on the same items that now include red ‘traffic light’ nutritional label for
unhealthy items. A simple regression model to test for the effect of the nutritional label is:
b∗ij = α0 +α1T +βZi+ ij, where bij is individual i ’s bid on product j, T is an indicator variable
taking the value of 1 for the treatment with traffic light labels, Z is vector of demographic
controls,  is an error term, and α0, α1, and β are coefficients to be estimated. The primary
interest is in the sign and significance of α1. A reasonable hypothesis is that α1 < 0; inclusion
of ‘red’ warning signs will reduce WTP for a food. However, there may be some people who
will exhibit psychological reactance and respond to the policy in an unanticipated manner (Just
and Hanks, 2015). Such a response, for example, can be observed if an individual does not like
‘being told what to do’ or interprets the policy as a threat to their autonomy or freedom. Thus,
there may be some people for which we might expect α1 > 0.
The simple econometric model outlined above could be modified in several ways to identify
heterogeneity in treatment effects. Perhaps the most straightforward approach is to include an
interaction between T and some or all of the Z ’s: b∗ij = α0 + α1T + βZi + θTZi + ij. Now, the
marginal effect of T on b∗ is α1 +θZi. This approach is limited in the sense that heterogeneity in
the treatment effect only arises through heterogeneity in observables, Zi. One might hypothesize
that, for example, men might be more likely to display reactance than females, but surely the
effect is more complicated than its relationship to gender. One way to address this concern
is to estimate a random coefficient model. In this case α1 is replaced with the individual-
specific parameter, αi1, which is then assumed to be, for example, Normally distributed: αi1 ∼
N(α1, σα1). This model allows for the estimation of the mean effect, α1, but also allows for
differential responses via the estimated standard deviation of the treatment effect, σα1 . A
challenge with this approach is that it requires an assumption about the distribution of the
treatment effect. In the case of the reactance example, it is not clear that one would expect the
treatment effect to be normally distributed across people. An alternative approach is the latent
class model. In this case, a number of classes, C, are specified and one estimates class-specific
parameters, α0c +α1cT + bcZi, along with the probability of respondents falling into each class.
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Typically AIC or BIC measures are used to determine the number of classes, C. This approach
can permit more distinct treatment heterogeneity, where for example, α1c=1 might be positive
and α1c=2 might be negative, with the model revealing the share of the sample fitting each
pattern.
There is much more that can be done with auction data to generate actionable insights.
Lusk (2010) shows, for example, how auction bids can be used to identify consumer segments
via cluster analysis or product groupings via factor analysis or multidimensional scaling.
7 Disclosure, pre-registration, pre-analysis and open data
& materials
This section is motivated by the recent move of individuals, scientific societies and journals
to embrace and promote more transparency in social science research. Here, we discuss issues
that the various Agricultural Economics Associations and Journals in the field have not yet
officially reacted to.19 We believe that in the near future, these issues will become a higher
priority and that most experimental research will eventually have to hold up to these stan-
dards. At the present time, however, there are only a handful of pre-registered studies that
are related to experimental auctions and consumers’ WTP (all of these are registered to AEA’s
CRT registry). However, we hope that our discussion here will stimulate more interest in the
field of experimental auctions for agricultural economics research.
Given that experimental research is expanding and the advantages of experimentation are
getting into the spotlight, along with the recent crisis in the replicability of experimental studies,
there has been a call to set up practices that will promote transparency in social science research.
Miguel et al. (2014) define three core practices for more transparency in social science research:
disclosure, pre-analysis and pre-registration plans, and open-data/materials.
Disclosure is the systematic reporting of standards that researchers are (or should be) obliged
to disclose such as the measures, manipulations, data exclusions, and the final sample size. Many
prominent medical journals (BMJ, Lancet etc.) recommend or require that researchers adhere
to the CONSORT (Moher et al., 2010). In the absence of an endorsement of similar standards
by associations, Simmons et al. (2012) proposed a 21-word disclosure to accompany manuscripts
regarding the authors’ knowledge that they did not p-hack: ‘We report how we determined our
sample size, all data exclusions (if any), all manipulations, and all measures in the study’. If
needed, supplemental material can be used to support the disclosure.
Pre-registration involves specifying in detail, in an online repository, information such as
19But see Josephson and Michler (2018) for a discussion of ethical issues facing the profession and a few
proposals to address these issues.
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the number of subjects, the treatment and relevant stimuli, the outcome variable, predic-
tion/hypothesis, the pre-analysis plan etc. that altogether constitute the plan for a study.
The whole plan can be hosted in one of the available online repositories which can be accessed
by interested parties (editors, reviewers, readers) and receives a time stamp. Although some
repositories have time limited embargoes, the plan can be made public or not at the will of
the researchers. For example, AEA’s RCT registry can keep key information hidden until the
time when the trial is completed. Some of these repositories are the Open Science Framework
(https://osf.io/), AsPredicted (https://aspredicted.org/), American Economic Associ-
ation’s RCT registry (https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/), the Evidence in Gover-
nance and Politics registry (http://egap.org/content/registration) etc. Likely, registra-
tion for many economic experiments will be diverted to AEA’s RCT registry since, as of January
2018, registration in the RCT registry has become mandatory for all submissions to AEA jour-
nals.
Some people share concerns about the time and effort costs involved with pre-registration.
In addition, there are concerns as per if pre-registration can actually prevent deceiving practices.
Simonsohn (2018) makes two arguments against this intuition. First, because people interpret
ambiguity in self-serving ways, by reducing ambiguity through pre-registration will result in
reduced self-serving biases. A smaller inclination to a self-serving bias will likely reduce the
temptation to convince oneself after data collection that what worked was what was planned
all along. Second, researchers may engage in deceiving practices either by omission or by
commission. Likely, very few researchers would engage themselves in deception by commission
and since pre-registration transforms a what would otherwise be a deceptive practice by omission
to an explicit lie, we would expect a significant reduction of deceptive practices with widespread
pre-registration.
So why would someone want to pre-register their research plan? Advocates claim this is the
only way that criticism about data mining, p-hacking and other questionable research practices
can be muted. Pre-registration creates a new step in the work-flow of research but it is seen as a
good way to produce rigorous results that would allow a sharp distinction between confirmatory
and exploratory analysis. To incentivize researchers to use pre-registration, many journals
are now offering the option of registered reports. Registered reports involve peer reviewing a
submitted research plan before data collection. If the research plan is given a positive evaluation,
then the proposed paper will be given a conditional acceptance and a promise to publish it
regardless of the outcome. Currently more than 100 journals use Registered Reports as a
regular submission (the list is maintained by the Center for Open Science: https://perma.
cc/KV4F-57ES). The vast majority of these journals are Psychology and Neuroscience journals;
there is one political science journal (the Journal of Experimental Political Science) and one
economics journal (the Journal of Development Economics).
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We feel that the biggest drawback for researchers pre-registering their studies will be a
commitment to a specific pre-analysis plan. Committing to a pre-analysis plan includes, among
others, deciding on the precise definition of a primary outcome variable (or multiple co-primary
outcomes) and of potential secondary outcomes, specific variable definitions, any inclusion or
exclusion restrictions, statistical models, hypothesis testing methods (including correcting for
multiple hypothesis testing if many primary outcomes are defined) and covariates (potentially
including measures of standardized differences as described in Section 2), subgroup analysis
etc.20
Olken (2015) summarizes the benefits and risks of committing to a pre-analysis plan. Re-
searchers who put a lot of detail and effort in coming up with a pre-analysis plan could benefit
from the careful thought processes required of going through their data analysis, and selecting
which variables to collect and methods to apply for the analysis. This step could also involve
researchers writing their statistical programs and run them on mock up data.21 For the research
community, it increases the confidence that the analysis did not just involve picking and report-
ing the most significant specification. While fully specifying all the analysis ex-ante could be
considered an ambitious plan, this does not mean that additional analysis cannot be performed
if not mentioned in the pre-analysis plan. One could for example still include results from anal-
ysis not included in the pre-analysis plan in the paper but these should be clearly indicated in
the paper as not part of the pre-analysis plan. Coffman and Niederle (2015) offer arguments
about te limited upside of pre-analysis plans and propose that economics move towards valuing
replications and robustness checks of positive results instead.
To address the challenges of committing to a detailed pre-analysis plan, Anderson and
Magruder (2017) and Fafchamps and Labonne (2016) revived an idea of testing the out-of
sample performance of predictors in ‘hold-out samples’.22 Roughly speaking, the approach
involves withholding a fraction of a sample, say half of it, and run an exploratory analysis
on these data. One could then choose which hypotheses to test and the methods to test the
hypotheses based on the exploratory analysis and then come up with a more well-informed pre-
analysis plan using insights from the exploratory analysis. Once a specific pre-analysis plan has
been decided and registered, the researcher can then use the other part of the sample to employ
20To pinpoint the pitfalls of subgroup analysis, Christensen and Miguel (2018) cite a story that first makes
one laugh but then prompts deeper thinking. When a collaborative group of researchers were asked by journal
editors to report subgroup analysis in a trial of aspirin and streptokinase use after heart attacks, the researchers
found that this medication is beneficial, except for patients born under Libra and Gemini astrological signs, for
whom there was a harmful effect.
21This is certainly possible, for example, if one runs a computerized experiment e.g., using zTree. Mock up
data files can be generated before ever running an experiment and read into the statistical program of one’s
choice which could help on building the code for statistical analysis.
22This is an approach that has long been used in psychology and statistics (see citations in Anderson and
Magruder, 2017) as well as to judge the predictive fit in the marketing literature (Erdem, 1996; Roy et al., 1996)
and in the economics literature (Drichoutis and Lusk, 2014, 2016; Norwood et al., 2004) for model selection.
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the pre-analysis plan. The split approach does come at a cost, however, since the split sample
loses power relative to a full-sample pre-analysis plan on hypotheses which were anticipated.
The final point in Miguel et al. (2014) concerns open data and materials. We feel that
agricultural economics journals have moved in the right direction over this and in line with
data availability policies at top economics journals. For example, ERAE’s guidelines to authors
clearly states that ‘The editors reserve the right to refuse to publish articles where the data,
programs, etc. are not provided and where, in their view, there is no justifiable reason for
not making them available.’ The creation of journal archives has a long history dating back
to Dewald et al. (1986) where by exploiting a change in the editorial policy of the Journal of
Money, Credit and Banking that required authors to make the data available upon request,
they found that the proportion of authors that submitted programs or data was significantly
larger after the introduction of the policy. They then tried to replicate nine papers from authors
that submitted their data to JMCB and found that only two of these could be replicated in
their entirety. Dewald et al. (1986) suggested that journals require data and codes at time of
submission.
In response to Dewald et al. (1986), the JMCB adopted a data and code archive policy.
However, future replication attempts to the same journal (McCullough et al., 2006) were just
marginally more successful: of the 186 empirical articles, only 69 had archive entries; 7 could
not be replicated due to lack of software or the use of proprietary data; only 14 out of 62 articles
could be replicated.
McCullough et al. (2008) examined compliance of depositing data in the journal’s archive
for journals that required this and found that the Journal of Applied Econometrics had a 99%
compliance rate which they attributed to the fact that i) JAE had an editorial position for the
archive manager and ii) that a paper is not published until the authors have made their data
available. However, replication was extremely low which they attributed to the fact that no
code was required to accompany the data files. In the meantime, things have not gotten better.
Recently, Chang and Li (2017, 2018) were able to replicate only 33% of papers from 13 journals
independently of the authors and 49% with help from the authors.
As far as experimental auctions research is concerned, we are not aware of any formal attempt
yet to replicate results using data and codes from previously published papers. It is likely that
a good percentage of this literature will follow the trends of the general economics literature.
Independently of the current status of replicability of experimental auction results, there are
things that we would endorse for the benefit of the profession and science in general. Major
agricultural economics journals should make it mandatory to submit data and codes at the time
of submission. Then an editor should be assigned as the manager of the archive. However, we
also believe that it would be beneficial for overall transparency that the editor not only makes
sure that data and codes are submitted but that any paper is accepted conditional on the
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managing editor or a third party being able to exactly replicate the results of the experimental
paper using the data and codes provided by the authors during the submission (this is the
verification process described in Clemens (2015) and Christensen and Miguel (2018)).
As far as availability of materials is concerned, as readers and reviewers of experimental
auctions papers, we still often come across experimental auctions work that does not include
experimental instructions. We believe this is a very crucial step that is often neglected in the
review process, which could make a big difference when evaluating the merit of a paper. This
is because even subtle words or the way phrases are expressed in the instructions could induce
effects up and above what the authors believe their manipulation is inducing. We believe that
one possible reason that instructions sometimes are not submitted with the paper is that there
was never instructions distributed or shown to subjects; i.e., the experimenter orally explained
the mechanics of the auctions and then let subjects bid on the products. As we explain in
Section 3.5 this is not a practice we would endorse.
A final and perhaps subtle remark concerning transparency is that authors should make
sure when using links pointing to websites that provide complementary information about their
methods, analysis or any other material, that these links will outlive the paper. Normally, this
is not the case because the internet changes rapidly. The solution is to make links permanent
via services that archive websites e.g., http://archive.org/web and https://perma.cc/. The
careful reader will notice that most of the links in this paper that point to online content, use one
of these services. Another solution regarding materials associated with any research project is to
post everything in an online repository like the Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/).
As a testament to the changes that other fields are undergoing, recently the journal Cortex
(Chambers, 2018) has introduced the Transparency and Openness Promotion (TOP) guidelines
(Nosek et al., 2015). The TOP Guidelines are a certification scheme in which journals and
research organizations declare their level of adherence to a series of standards for enabling
research transparency and reproducibility. These standards include, among others, availability
of data (e.g., data must be posted to a repository), analysis code and digital research materials
(code and materials must be posted to a repository; a Level 3 adherence standard would require
that analysis is replicated independently before publication), preregistration of study procedures
and analysis plans (e.g., authors declare if study has been pre-registered and provide access to
reviewers), replication (e.g., the journal uses registered reports as a submission option) etc.
In addition, a number of journals have agreed that publishing peer review reports can be
beneficial for the research community by increasing transparency of the assessment process
(Available at https://perma.cc/Z7TM-G66C). These benefits might include reviewer and edi-
torial accountability, training opportunities for educating students about the peer review process
as well as a way to provide credit for peer review (since 2012, Publons https://publons.com
provides a free service for academics to track, verify and showcase their peer review and editorial
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contributions for academic journals).
8 Field vs. lab
Harrison and List (2004) suggested a typology of economic experiments based on six classifi-
cation criteria in terms of the nature of: subjects’ pool, information, the good, the task/trading
rules, and the stakes (amounts involved), plus the experimental environment. Harrison and
List’s (2004) typology distinguish ‘conventional’ lab experiments from ‘artefactual’, ‘framed’,
and ‘natural’ field experiments, based on a growing role of a target population, context-relevant
information, goods, and tasks, as well as investigations occurring in a natural environment
where the subjects are not aware that they are being observed.
A number of studies have moved outside the lab setting to the location where consumers typ-
ically make their purchasing decisions (i.e, ‘the field’). Gneezy (2016) call for an increase of the
proportion of experimental studies based on field data in marketing research. Vecchio and Bor-
rello (2018) maintain that many researchers who used experimental auctions in food consumer
behavior studies think that more studies should be performed in real market environments.
The choice of whether to conduct research in the field or lab depends on numerous factors
(Harrison and List, 2004), the importance of which may change depending on the specific
purpose and audience of the study, while also keeping in mind that the methodological approach
may also be affected by the experimental practices considered acceptable in a specific discipline
(Croson, 2005).
The core trade-off between performing a lab or a field study that is often discussed is between
control and realism or, to put in another way, between internal and external validity (Roe and
Just, 2009). Lab settings allow researchers a greater degree of control but often under sterile
environments. By contrast, field settings occur in a more natural setting that could include
context-relevant information and cues, but are often harder to control. All in all, researchers
must consider that conducting a study in the field, instead of in the lab, will necessarily introduce
more noise and reduce the control over the experimental procedure, which could imply the need
for more sophisticated models to consider control variables (Gneezy, 2016; Vecchio and Borrello,
2018).
Harrison and List (2004) maintain that lab and field studies should complement each other
since they have different characteristics and given the possibility that what works in the lab
does not necessarily works in the field and vice-versa. The key issue is that moving from a lab
to the field can change bids, which is the most relevant information obtained in an experimental
auction. Lusk and Fox (2003), for example, show that bids for a food product can increase
when moving from a class-room lab setting to a bakery setting. The results are not necessarily
surprising: people enter a field environment with the intention of making a purchase on the
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category of good in question. In addition, in the field many substitutes of the auctioned product
can be readily available.
The move to field settings can have important implications on study findings related to
effects and significance of factors and covariates. List (2004) showed that individuals with more
experience in the field were less likely to suffer from the endowment effect; List (2003) showed
that even experienced subjects, when put in a lab, appear to behave altruistically, but when
moved back to a more natural environment behave more in accordance with self-interest; Dyer
and Kagel (1996) showed a similar effect with regard to the winner’s curse in common value
auctions; Sousa and Munro (2012) confirmed this effect also in virtual online experiments.
In practical terms, field experiments can often dramatically reduce the cost of subject re-
cruitment because the researcher travels to where the subjects are, unlike most lab experiments
where subjects would travel to where the lab is. Incentives to participate in the field often
include food products or coupons, which are an integral part of the design, like for instance in
Lusk et al. (2001), Lusk et al. (2006), and Klain et al. (2014). However, until recently with the
advent of mobile payment systems, such as Square, it was generally difficult to arrange payment
mechanisms in field settings where people often did not have cash. Nevertheless, one can still
encounter challenges in specific field settings like grocery stores or supermarkets if an agreement
with store managers or company managers is required. For example, while traditional surveys
are usually well accepted, an experiment involving sales for goods also sold in the store may be
questioned or opposed by the managers who may also be worried about customer complaints
that may arise from a situation that is not under their control. According to Gneezy (2016),
collaborative experiments may require a lengthy process of reciprocal understanding between
academic and non-academic partners, regarding the potential benefits and costs for the latter.
Another important aspect to consider when planning a field experiment are issues related to
sampling methods and procedures. While a lab experiment could rely upon subjects randomly
picked from a representative panel, it is usually much more difficult to select a random sample
in the field, and so the chances of having a biased sample would generally be higher (Belot and
James, 2014).
Some practical advice can be provided considering the discussion above:
(a) given the reduced control over the environment and unavoidable noise affecting a field
experiment, it is highly desirable to reduce respondent’s burden; therefore, it is advisable
not to design long experiments and use very short instructions (1 page or less) for the
participant. It is also recommended that researchers should devote a significant amount
of time and effort in training data collectors.
(b) when choosing the auction mechanism, lean towards the simplest ones, such as the 2nd
price auctions with very small groups (2-3 subjects).
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(c) in case the experiment is aimed at providing industry-relevant information and statistical
inference is among the expected outcomes, ensure an adequate sample size, use multiple
locations in the field to get a representative sample of the target population and enforce
measures to reduce selection bias to increase generalizability of results, according to the
scope, purpose and audience of the study. If this is not feasible due to financial and time
constraints, it is advisable to pair the auction study with a hypothetical (e.g., a choice
experiment) survey (Lusk, 2010) and use the auction to calibrate the larger study results
and correct for hypothetical bias (e.g., Alfnes and Rickertsen, 2007; Fox et al., 1998).
(d) consider the influence of the presence of perfect or partial substitutes in the locations and
settings chosen for the field experiment, and control for these variables if possible.
(e) carefully plan the collaboration with the non-academic partners (e.g., store or restaurant
managers), set up agreements clearly identifying advantages (such as purchase of the
auctioned products and share of business-relevant study results), administrative burdens,
costs and commitments.
(f) plan logistics issues very carefully, considering the trade-offs between on-site delivery and
home delivery of the product: the former can rely upon the logistics, storage, and payment
facilities of the non-academic partner in the field, while the latter can be implemented by
collecting bids, payments, and delivery information on the spot and sending the purchased
product to the respondents’ address (this may need additional care in managing data
because of privacy regulations).
9 Behavioral factors in auctions
A number of behavioral factors can influence bidding behavior in experimental auctions.
In this section, we will discuss a number of studies that have directly examined some of these
behavioral factors in relation to experimental auctions and their implications for the design
of future studies. Since trying to review all the experimental auction behavioral studies is
a daunting task, we will focus on a handful of contributions which directly test the effect of
behavioral factors that have not been thoroughly examined in the past. So, while certainly
also important, we will not cover issues related to the effect of information, labels, reference
prices/products, and endowments.
9.1 Personality traits
Personality traits have entered economists’ area of interest as important determinants for
economic behavior. One of the most widely cited papers on the economics and psychology
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of personality traits (Borghans et al., 2008) makes a convincing case using evidence from the
Perry preschool program. The program targeted disadvantaged African-American children in
Michigan in the ’70s and children were followed up to age 40. Apparently, the program was
successful in changing personality and motivation of disadvantaged children which then resulted
in measurable success on a variety of measures of socioeconomic achievement over the life cycles
of participants (see Borghans et al., 2008, and citations therein).
Given the importance of personality in predicting outcomes and explaining variation in
economically-relevant behaviors, it seems quite possible that personality traits could explain
the differences in bidding behavior in experimental auctions. Grebitus et al. (2013) examined
this issue in both hypothetical and non-hypothetical settings. Their results suggest that there
is heterogeneity in valuation estimates across personality traits and that traits may partly
explain the differences in behaviors or valuations from auction and choice experiments found
in previous studies (Gracia et al., 2011; Lusk and Schroeder, 2006). Interestingly, their results
also suggest that the effects of personality are stronger in non-hypothetical auctions than in
hypothetical auctions. The implication of this result is that people will behave differently in real
and hypothetical environments depending on their personality type, suggesting that personality
traits may well explain a significant portion of hypothetical bias.
9.2 Cognitive Ability
It is well known that auction mechanisms may not always provide accurate valuation es-
timates, given behavioral anomalies on bidding behavior observed in lab experiments. For
example, one consistent finding in experimental auction studies is that subjects tend to deviate
from rational behavior and exhibit a pattern of overbidding in second price auctions (SPA)
(Andreoni et al., 2007; Cooper and Fang, 2008; Drichoutis et al., 2015; Georganas et al., 2017;
Kagel et al., 1987; Kagel and Levin, 1993). Kagel et al. (1987) inferred that subjects submit
a higher bid in SPAs due to the impression that submitting higher bids improves the prob-
ability of winning with no real cost because the highest bidder pays the second highest bid.
An alternative explanation was given by Morgan et al. (2003), who proposed that participants
bid based on behavioral motives such as ‘spite’. They suggested that subjects overbid in SPAs
since the profit earned by a rival bidder could be reduced by a losing bidder’s own bid. This
overbidding behavior can be also explained by a ‘joy of winning’, in which subjects derive extra
utility from winning the auction. Interestingly, Cooper and Fang (2008) found that small and
medium overbids are consistent with the ‘joy of winning’ hypothesis, while large overbids are
more consistent with the ‘spite’ hypothesis.
Understanding bid deviation in experimental auctions is important since it can potentially
explain subjects irrational behavior, and it can also provide more clarity in determining when
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and how bids should be interpreted when trying to elicit homegrown valuations. Kagel et al.
(1987) and Ausubel (2004) argued that the difficulty of understanding the SPA could lead to
overbidding in the SPA as compared to the ascending-price English auction, even though both
auction mechanisms are strategically equivalent. More recently, Li (2017) showed that the over-
bidding behavior in SPAs is due to the fact that it is not an obviously strategy-proof (OSP)
mechanism, where an OSP mechanism is defined as one that a cognitively limited agent can rec-
ognize the weakly dominant strategy. This concept suggests that more cognitively able bidders
will understand the strategic properties of an SPA better than low cognitive ability bidders.
Lee et al. (2017) investigated this relationship directly by examining how individuals cognitive
ability influences bid deviations in SPAs. They first measured subjects’ cognitive abilities using
a nonverbal Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices (RSPM) test and then classified subjects
into two groups (i.e., a high cognitive ability group and low cognitive ability group) based on
their RSPM test performance. Each group then participated in a series of induced value SPAs.
Their results suggest that more cognitively able subjects behave in closer accordance with theory
and that cognitive ability partially explains heterogeneity in bidding behavior. Their finding
is important since it implies that experimental auction researchers must make sure that the
auction mechanism used in the study is clearly understood, especially by low cognitive ability
subjects.
9.3 Emotions
Roider and Schmitz (2012) examined how robust is the standard symmetric sealed-bid auc-
tions model with risk-neutral players and private independent values. Specifically, they were
interested in assessing subjects’ bidding behavior when they anticipate the positive emotions of
winning and the negative emotions of losing. They also investigated whether the introduction of
anticipated emotions can shed light on various findings of bidding behavior in auctions with in-
dependent private values. Using a simple extension of the standard model of symmetric auctions
—where bidders anticipate some (constant) positive emotions of winning and some (constant)
negative emotions of losing — they showed that if bidders anticipate the joy of winning, bids
will be larger than in the standard model in both first-price and second-price auctions. However,
if bidders anticipate a disutility of losing, the implications depend on the auction format. In
a SPA, bidders who still participate bid more when they anticipate negative emotions because
they are more eager to avoid losing, and while bidders with very low valuations will not par-
ticipate, all participating bidders overbid by the same amount due to the anticipated emotions.
They also explained that in SPAs the joy of winning and the disutility of losing affect bids in
the same way. In contrast, in first-price auctions, participating bidders with small valuations
who anticipate that losing is painful, bid less than in the standard model. So for participating
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bidders with small valuations, a disutility of losing actually reduces bids, while bidders with
high valuations bid more.
9.4 Mood
Mood states can influence behavior by influencing both the content and the process of cog-
nition (Capra, 2004). Moods can also play an important role in the construction of preferences
that, in turn, influence decision-making and judgment (Johnson et al., 2005; Lichtenstein and
Slovic, 2006; Payne et al., 1999; Slovic, 1995). A few studies have examined the effect of moods
in experimental auctions. Lerner et al. (2004) found that a negative mood state in the form of
sadness (disgust) can increase (decrease) willingness to pay (WTP), while Capra et al. (2010)
found only weak mood effects on WTP. Drichoutis et al. (2014) also explored how positive and
negative mood states affect bidding behavior in experimental auctions to test the robustness
of the findings of these two papers. Their study differs from the other two studies in that
they focused not only on the effect of mood states on WTP but also on people’s rationality, as
represented by the rate of preference reversal for lotteries. They found that mood states can
significantly affect the rate of preference reversal and bidding behavior in experimental auction
valuation. Specifically, they showed that subjects under a positive mood state exhibit more
rational behavior (i.e., fewer preference reversals) and provide lower bid values than others. Re-
sults from these studies suggest that researchers may need to take subjects’ moods into account
when conducting experimental auctions.
9.5 Other Regarding Preferences and Motives
The standard theory predicts that altruistic subjects underbid in the Vickrey auctions com-
pared to the BDM, while spiteful subjects overbid in Vickrey auctions. Flynn et al. (2016)
were not able to confirm these predictions, however. While they were able to observe aggre-
gate underbidding in Vickrey auctions, their results were not driven by the choices of altruistic
subjects.
9.6 Hormones
Behavioral economics has embraced the view that we can use the lens of biology to look at
economic behavior. By now there is accumulating literature suggesting that gender differences in
preferences and behavior can be attributed to hormonal differences between males and females.
Given that a number of studies have found that females tend to bid higher than males in
auctions (Casari et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2009; Ham and Kagel, 2006; Pearson and Schipper,
2013), Chen et al. (2009) and Pearson and Schipper (2013) examined how the bidding and
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profits of females differ across the menstrual cycle. Menstrual cycle information can be used as
a proxy of level of hormones in females that naturally fluctuate during the cycle. Chen et al.
(2009) found that women bid higher than men in all phases of their menstrual cycle in a first-
price auction but not in a second-price auction. Moreover, for first-price auctions they infer that
higher bidding in the follicular phase and lower bidding in the luteal phase are driven entirely by
oral hormonal contraceptives. Pearson and Schipper (2013) report that naturally cycling women
bid significantly higher than men and earn significantly lower profits than men (in a first price
auction) except during the midcycle (when fecundity is highest). They also found that women
who use hormonal contraceptives bid significantly higher and earn substantially lower profits
than men. This correlation they found between the use of hormonal contraceptives and bidding
or profits, however, may be due to a selection effect or to hormones contained in contraceptives.
All hormonal contraceptives contain synthetic versions of the sex hormone progesterone, and
some also contain a version of estradiol. So, the evidence is far from conclusive.
Schipper (2015) conducted an auction experiment in which he collected salivary steroid
hormones such as testosterone, estradiol, progesterone, and cortisol. He suggested that testos-
terone may affect bidding and profits via risk aversion. Basal testosterone has also been found
to be positively correlated with ‘aggression,’ which may be another channel through which
basal testosterone affects bidding in auctions. The results indicate that females bid significantly
higher and earn significantly lower profits than males. Moreover, females who use hormonal
contraceptives bid significantly higher and earn significantly lower profits. With respect to sali-
vary basal hormones, Schipper (2015) found that bids are significantly positively correlated and
profits are negatively correlated with basal salivary progesterone, but only in females who do
not use hormonal contraceptives. In his study he did not find significant correlations between
bidding or profits and salivary basal testosterone, estradiol, or cortisol.
9.7 Sensory cues
Many experimental auction studies conducted by agricultural and applied economists are
focused on food products. The literature, however, has remained ambiguous as to whether
sensory cues, such as taste or smell, needs to be measured in experimental auctions used to
elicit consumers’ WTP for food. While a number of studies have included sensory tests in their
auctions, these studies did not completely isolate the role of taste in bidding behavior (e.g.,
Drichoutis et al., 2017; Feuz et al., 2004; Holmquist et al., 2012; Lusk et al., 2001; Platter et al.,
2005; Umberger and Feuz, 2004; Umberger et al., 2002)
Typically in these studies, the subjects were asked to taste the food products and were then
asked to bid on these products. So, the effect of taste was not directly tested. In other studies
that included taste, a within-subjects design was utilized where subjects were progressively
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given more information about the foods in the auction and then eventually allowed to taste the
food products prior to one of the later bidding rounds (Akaichi et al., 2017; Bi et al., 2012;
Demont et al., 2013, 2012; Melton et al., 1996).
One study that directly tested the effect of taste in experimental auctions is Lewis et al.
(2016b). They used a between-subjects design and were able to compare bids from an auction
where subjects tasted the products and an auction where subjects did not taste the products.
Their results suggest that taste influences bids, and they concluded that it would be valuable
to include taste in auction designs when evaluating consumers’ WTP for food products.
Studies that try to isolate the effect of sensory cues other than taste are even more rare. A
recent study used controlled laboratory experiments to experimentally manipulate the ambient
scent of the lab with a citrus fragrance (Kechagia and Drichoutis, 2017). The authors found
that subjects that participated in a SPA auction inside the scented room were willing to pay
up to 49% more than subjects who were not exposed to the scent.
In addition to the importance of sensory cues, there is also evidence that presence of the
good to be auctioned matters. For example, Bushong et al. (2010) elicited valuations using
the BDM mechanism under three different conditions: (a) text displays, (b) image displays,
and (c) displays of the actual items. They found that subjects’ bids were 40-61% larger in the
real display than in the image and text displays. Their findings suggest the saliency of the
‘tangibility’ issue in experimental auctions. In particular, follow-up experiments in Bushong
et al. (2010) suggest that the presence of real items trigger preprogrammed consummatory
Pavlovian processes that promote behaviors that lead to contact with appetitive items when
they are available.
9.8 Attention
Product evaluation can be influenced by the amount of attention paid to product stimuli,
which can be linked to eye movement (see Orquin and Mueller Loose, 2013, for an overview
on studies). When an individual looks at a stimulus, attention is paid to the stimulus (Wedel
and Pieters, 2000). Lewis et al. (2016a) used eye tracking to measure how attention to brand,
package attributes, and product information impacts consumer WTP for branded energy drinks.
They found evidence that attention can explain the variation in consumers’ WTP for branded
energy drinks containing different sweeteners. In another study, Rihn and Yue (2016) examined
the impact of extrinsic cues (specifically production method, origin, and nutrient content claim
labels) on consumers’ WTP for processed foods (apple juice and salad mix) using an experi-
mental auction in combination with eye-tracking analysis. Their results suggest that consumer
visual attention increases for important product attributes that positively or negatively impact
their WTP bids.
36
10 Discussion and conclusions
This review provided a state of the art discussion of the best practices in the design and
execution of experimental auctions, with the aim of improving cost-benefit and welfare analysis,
theory testing, as well as marketing recommendations from their findings. Here, in the final
section, we offer a brief list of recommendations distilled from our discussion above and then
conclude with some suggested areas for future research.
Our first recommendation relates to power analysis. Sample size calculations should be
performed at the design stage and these calculations should be used as stopping rules once the
desired sample size has been achieved. Given finite resources, adopting this practice will likely
lead to simpler designs (i.e., fewer treatments) in order to ensure sufficient number of subjects
(and thus sufficient power) for the main queries of interest. It will also result in WTP estimates
that are more precisely measured and treatment effects that have been more reliably identified.
Another added benefit is that it should improve the credibility and publishability of null results.
Second, practice or training rounds in auctions should be more systematically analyzed
when the aim of the study is to causally identify treatment effects. In order to causally identify
a treatment effect, a sufficiently large sample size is needed to ensure that randomization to
treatment was successful. One way to judge whether such randomization was successful is to
analyze data from the training rounds as a form of a placebo test (Rosenbaum, 2002, p. 214)
i.e., a test which examines the effect of the treatment on a variable known to be unaffected by
the cause of interest. We believe that systematic adoption of this practice will lead to increased
confidence in the underlying causal mechanisms.
Another important motivation for conducting practice and training rounds is that people
often have misconceptions about the auction mechanisms, which can lead to non-truthful value
revelation. Practice homegrown or practice induced value auctions should be always employed,
unless inexperience with the mechanism is desirable. Quizzes and simple, easy to understand
detailed instructions should be provided to subjects as well. All this material should then be
made available to reviewers to allow them to directly assess the experimental design. This would
also contribute to more transparency of research practices. The use of multiple-price lists (e.g.,
Andersen et al., 2006; Klain et al., 2014) or non-hypothetical choice experiments (Alfnes et al.,
2006; Lusk and Schroeder, 2004) can be seen as an attempt to utilize more easily understood
mechanisms, with the trade-off being less precise information about consumers’ WTP than the
auction method that have been the focus of this review.
When the experimental design includes multiple rounds of bidding, research results suggest
that it is best to avoid providing price feedback between rounds since this could lead to a
number of adverse effects on the bidding behavior. In addition, data on beliefs about prices of
field substitutes should be collected when possible so that it can be incorporated in subsequent
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econometric analysis.
Field auction studies remain under-utilized and more of these studies should be conducted
and compared with lab settings in order to highlight the role of the natural field context. One
factor preventing the wider adoption of experimental auctions in field settings is the need to
form auction groups. This is one reason why the BDM mechanism has been more popular in
field settings than the Vickrey auction. However, given the limitations of the BDM mechanism
discussed above, a 2nd price Vickrey auction could be conducted even with just two subjects in
a group. Or, a group can be formed later, with payments and product delivery occurring at a
later time. This was the approach used in a few previous studies (e.g., List and Lucking-Reiley,
2000). Research exploiting field-relevant variables in field settings to test hypotheses of interest
is also lacking. For example, the natural variation of experience between dealers and non-dealers
of sports-cards has been a key manipulating factor in early field valuation experiments (List and
Lucking-Reiley, 2000; List and Shogren, 1998). A field-setting of particular interest to food and
agricultural economists that remains largely unexploited is farmers markets (e.g., Toler et al.,
2009).
Given the growth in the use of experimental auctions, one might suspect that all the low-
hanging fruit (research-wise) has been picked. We are more optimistic about the possibilities for
new discoveries. What remains to be done? Although mentioned in Lusk and Shogren (2007),
there remains a dearth of studies showcasing the external validity of auction studies. To our
knowledge, there has been no comparison of experimental auction behavior with scanner data,
for example. There have been a number of such comparisons with other methods —like choice
experiments (e.g., Brooks and Lusk, 2010; Chang et al., 2009; Lusk et al., 2006) —but not
with auctions. That is, we need studies that compare auction generated data with real-world
purchases. If auctions studies are shown to have good external validity, then this will boost the
confidence of researchers in the experimental auctions field in promoting this value elicitation
tool in academic and business circles.
There is also much to learn about how values in auctions are influenced by social networks.
Demont et al. (2013) and Richards et al. (2014) both show that peoples values are significantly
influenced by others’ values. Understanding how beliefs and new information filter through
such networks is key to understanding acceptance of technology, effects of media scares, or the
success of advertising or new product introduction.
An avenue that has not been significantly explored yet in the experimental auctions litera-
ture is a road already taken by other subfields in economics; that is, the possibility of massively
increasing sample sizes by doing more experiments online.23 Auctions impose an additional
challenge because of the simultaneity nature of the submission of bids. However, the interactive
23See also Katkar and Reiley (2007); Lucking-Reiley et al. (2007) for early studies on auctions using data
from eBay and Augenblick (2016) for a more recent study focused on penny auctions.
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nature of experiments is not totally impossible to overcome (e.g., Arechar et al., 2018). Further-
more, studies now consistently show that data obtained online (e.g., via Amazon’s Mechanical
Turk; but see Dreyfyss (2018) for a warning and some remedies) is not significantly harmed by
the lack of control over the conditions under which the responses are recorded (Johnson and
Ryan, 2018).
A concern for experimental auctions conducted for food items is the low-value of the good.
Subjects with low induced values tend to bid further away from their induced value (e.g.,
Drichoutis et al., 2015) as compared to when high induced values are assigned to them, and in
mechanisms like the second price auction, incentives for truthful value revelation are weaker for
lower-value subjects (Lusk et al., 2007). This would imply that auctions with low value items
are more likely to suffer from measurement error, which could be partly due to the lower cost of
misbehaving for low value items. How can we increase the rather weak incentives for accurate
preference revelation in experimental auctions? Cason and Plott (2014) show that although
many subjects did not bid their induced value, they did state their correct valuation in a second
round of bidding after they were exposed to their mistake by rereading the instructions and
after receiving feedback. This is consistent with the findings in Malone and Lusk (2018) where
in a discrete choice experiment they provide feedback to inattentive respondents which are
subsequently given the opportunity to re-answer a ‘trap question’ that checks for attentiveness.
In Malone and Lusk (2018) individuals who do not correctly revise their responses after missing
a trap question have significantly different choice patterns than individuals who correctly answer
the trap question. Therefore nudging individuals toward their true preference could be a way
forward for induced value auctions. However, in homegrown value auctions we do not know
what a true preference is. In this case, tools from the contingent valuation literature could
be tested as for example, cheap talk scripts, budget constraint reminders and consequentiality
scripts (see Drichoutis et al., 2017, for details on such scripts). Given that we do not know
yet the effectiveness of these tools in experimental auctions, some proper evaluation of their
effectiveness is another area of future research that would be worth exploring. There may also
be alternative mechanisms that can further sharpen the gradient between participants bid-space
and their payoff-space.
Experimental auctions allow us to elicit willingness-to-pay or other valuation measures which
provide a mapping of preferences on the monetary space. A key assumption of classical economic
analysis is that of stability of preferences. In economic analysis, individual preferences are
considered to be stable over time. Andersen et al. (2008) argue that the assumption of stable
preferences lies in the ability to assign causation between changing opportunity sets and choices
in comparative statics exercises or, in Stigler and Becker’s (1977) words, “no significant behavior
has been illuminated by assumptions of differences in tastes”. If preferences are volatile with
respect to the passage of time, then Harrison et al. (2005) note that researchers and policy-
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makers using out-of-sample predictions should worry about their conclusions. However, we know
little about the individual and aggregate stability of WTP values over time (although see Lusk
(2017) for comparison of repeated choice experiments over time or studies like Dillaway et al.
(2011) or Shogren et al. (2000) that conducted experimental auctions with the same participants
at different points in time). Prospective studies that would repeatedly elicit consumer valuations
over time for a range of products using experimental auctions could provide some feedback
(especially if compared with other elicitation mechanisms) about the appropriateness of auctions
in value elicitation as a tool that satisfies the assumptions of economic theory.
Finally, the rise of the behavioral economics literature clearly shows that decision making
errors and biases can be identified in experimental auction settings. The much more difficult
issue is what we do with these biases. One stream of research has sought to develop methods
or techniques to eliminate the biases, also referred to as ‘debiasing’ (e.g., Cherry et al., 2003;
Kovalsky and Lusk, 2013; Shogren, 2006) with the presumption that more stable, well-informed,
market-disciplined preferences are most suitable for cost-benefit analysis. However, many of the
products we are interested in valuing are new or non-market goods (if they were traditional
market goods, we could use conventional demand estimation methods applied to the revealed
preference data). Understanding the process by which people learn and update their preferences
for these novel products, even if they are unstable, is important. The findings of studies that
examined behavioral biases have also undermined some of the conceptual foundations behind
welfare economics (Just, 2017; Lusk, 2014), but have also raised interesting, researchable ques-
tions about how people might act on others’ behavioral biases (e.g., Lusk et al., 2014) or respond
to paternalism from others (Debnam, 2017; Just and Hanks, 2015).
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